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Functional Participation in EU Delegated Regulation:
Lessons from the United States at the EU's
"Constitutional Moment"
STIJN SMISMANS*
INTRODUCTION
"Delegated regulation," "delegated legislation," "administrative rulemaking,"
or "regulatory implementation" are well-known phenomena in modern democ-
racies. Given the complexity of contemporary societies and the broad range of
issues (often of a technical nature) in which the state intervenes, regulation cannot
entirely be assured by normal legislative procedure, as this is too cumbersome, not
flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, and often not able to in-
tegrate the necessary technical expertise. Legislation will, therefore, delegate part
of the regulatory process to less cumbersome bodies. Yet while delegated regula-
tion is a general practice, and while its necessity is generally acknowledged, it has
not been an easy task to make it fit with the dominant understanding of democ-
racy in which parliament would adopt all measures of a generally binding nature,
whereas a "neutral bureaucracy" would ensure the application of the general rule
to the specific case.
There are considerable differences in the way the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) deal with delegated regulation and how they conceptualize
the legitimacy of such regulatory procedures beyond the normal legislative road.
In the United States, delegated regulation is the resort of independent regulatory
agencies, and the legitimacy of such administrative rulemaking has been thought
of mainly in terms of legislative mandate, due process, and participatory rights
guaranteed by judicial review. In the EU, delegated regulation is mainly adopted
through the so-called comitology procedures, where regulatory powers are not
delegated to independent agencies, but are exercised by the European Commis-
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STIJN SMISMANS
sioni in interaction with a comitology committee that is composed of representa-
tives from the national administrations, with, in certain cases, the final option that
the Council may decide the issue.2 Comitology has raised questions from a demo-
cratic point of view, in particular because it takes part of the regulatory process out
of the hands of the European Parliament. Yet, in contrast to their place in the
United States, the ideas of participatory rights, due process, and judicial review
have not found a prominent place in European political and institutional dis-
course regarding the legitimacy of comitology and delegated regulation. Rather,
it is argued that the legitimacy of European delegated regulation resides in the fact
that indirect, territorial representation by way of Member States' representatives
in the comitology committee, and the Council, could compensate for the lack of
parliamentary involvement. However, participatory processes for civil society or-
ganizations, stakeholders, or interest groups can and, to a certain extent, already
do play a role in EU delegated regulation. Moreover, in the context of the reforms
introduced by the Constitutional Treaty (still to be ratified), such functional par-
ticipation3-- combined with judicial review-may become more important in
guaranteeing the legitimacy of delegated regulation.
1. Implementation of European legislation is primarily the task of the Member States. CON-
SOLIDATED VERISION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 10, Dec. 24, 2002,
O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. According to Article 202 of the treaty, the Council
may only "in specific cases" reserve the right to directly exercise implementing powers. Most im-
plementation by Community Institutions thus results from the other option of Article 202, namely
that the Council can confer on the Commission the power to implement legislation and may im-
pose certain requirements with respect to the exercise of this power. Id. art. 202.
2. There are different comitology procedures, as set out in the Comitology Decision 87/373/
EEC as replaced by Council Decision 1999/468/EC, laying down the procedures for the exercise of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 1999 O.J. (L 184/23), corrigendum in 1999
O.J. (L 269/45). One can mainly distinguish between advisory committee procedure, management
committee procedure, and regulatory committee procedure (including, though, different vari-
ants). On the basic features of comitology, see Ellen Vos, EU Committees: The Evolution of Unfore-
seen Institutional Actors in European Product Regulation, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION,
LAW AND POLITICS 19, 19-22 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999) [hereinafter EU COMMIT-
TEES]; Georgh Haibach, The History of Comitology, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF
COMMITTEES IN THE EC 185 (Mads Andenas & Alexander Tirk eds., 2000); Koen Lenaerts & Am-
aryllis Verhoeven, Towards a Legal Framework for Executive Rule-Making in the EU? The Contri-
bution of the New Comitology Decision, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645-86 (2000).
3. To overcome the opposition between concepts such as interest groups, civil society organiza-
tions, and stakeholders, I use the concept of "functional participation." As opposed to "territorial
representation," on the basis of a territorially defined electoral mandate, "functional participation"
refers to the participation of organized groups in policymaking. For a more detailed justification of
mmm
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This article is divided into four parts. In the first section, I will show that
there is a gap between the discourse on the democratic (or undemocratic) nature
of comitology and the more recent European institutional discourse on the rele-
vance of civil-society participation in European policymaking. In the second sec-
tion, I will analyze how-despite the lack of attention in institutional and
academic discourse on this issue-in some cases civil-society participation has
been institutionalized in delegated regulation, and will argue that this may func-
tion as an additional source of legitimacy. In the third section, I will analyze
whether, according to the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), there
is a place for judicial review ensuring such functional participation. Finally, in
section four, I will describe how the current constitutional debate may change
the picture of delegated regulation. I will argue that, if the proposals made by the
Constitutional Treaty are implemented, there may be a further increasing role
for functional participation as an additional source of legitimacy in delegated
regulation, including a desirable, stronger judicial review by the Court on such
participation, which could bring the EU model of delegated regulation closer to
the U.S. version.
I. COMITOLOGY AND CIVIL-SOCIETY PARTICIPATION:
Two SEPARATE DISCOURSES
The legitimacy of comitology was initially questioned by the European Par-
liament, which saw itself bypassed in its regulatory procedures. As early as 1984,
the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution 4 that strongly criticized the
procedures for adaptation to technical and scientific progress based on comitol-
ogy. According to the report of the Legal Affairs Committee5 preparing that
resolution, such procedures allow the Commission "to enact measures of consid-
erable economic and political importance without Parliament's being given any
the use of this concept building on theories of functional democracy and functional representation,
see STIJN SMISMANs, LAW, LEGITIMACY AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: FUNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN
SOCIAL REGULATION 42-48 (2004). I limit the concept to the participation of interest groups or asso-
ciations and do not include other forms of participation beyond territorial representation, such as
participation of "independent experts" or of representatives from national administrations.
4. Resolution on Committees for the Adaptation of Directives to Technical and Scientific
Progress, 1984 O.J. (C 172/76).
5. Report of the Legal Affairs Committee on Committees for the Adaptation of Directives to
Technical and Scientific Progress, EUR. PARL. Doc. (1-205/84) (1984).
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opportunity to exercise its Treaty-enshrined duty of supervision; in effect, the
[comitology] committees exercise powers which in the general scheme of the
Treaties are conferred on the European Parliament." The EP consequently pro-
posed that it be involved in the implementation procedure, and requested that
the Commission and Council should refrain from setting up additional commit-
tees. Several factors, however, pushed the Community in the other direction.
The single-market project on the one hand, and dissatisfaction with the "har-
monization strategy" and the limits of mutual recognition on the other hand,
contributed to an intensive European regulatory strategy in which legislation
often sets out only the general principles, whereas implementation measures-
via comitology procedures-deal with the technical details.6
Also, in the academic literature, the normative debate on comitology has
mainly been phrased with reference to parliamentary representation and ac-
countability. Thus, scholars have primarily focused on comitology as an issue
that raises problems of delegation and institutional balance.7 In addition, the po-
litical science literature on the role of committees in EU policymaking more
broadly increased awareness of the lack of transparency of delegated regulation.
Against this gloomy picture, Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson developed
their model of "deliberative supranationalism."8 This model counters the domi-
nant negative image of comitology procedures and instead sees comitology as a
deliberative structure that, on the one hand, ensures that risk regulation in a
multilevel polity takes into account "national concerns," and on the other hand,
strips the defense of national sectarian interests by replacing negotiation with a
process of persuasion and argument. The legitimacy of the comitology proce-
6. See Josef Falke, Achievements and Unresolved Problems of European Standardization, in INTE-
GRATING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE INTO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING 187, 187 (Christian Joerges et
al. eds, 1997) (discussing the "new approach" and standardization).
7. Cf Christoph Demmke et al., The History of Comitology, in SHAPING EUROPEAN LAW AND
POLICY, THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES AND COMITOLOGY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 61, 63-65 (Robin
H. Pedler & Guenther F Schaefer eds., 1996) [hereinafter SHAPING EUROPEAN LAW]; Ellen Vos,
The Rise of Committees, 3 EUR. L.J. 210,213-14 (1997); Kieran St. C. Bradley, The European Parlia-
ment and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?, 3 EUR. L.J. 230,238-40 (1997) [hereinafter The Eu-
ropean Parliament and Comitology]; Kieran St. C. Bradley, Institutional Aspects of Comitology: Scenes
from the Cutting Room Floor [hereinafter Institutional Aspects of Comitology], in EU COMMITTEES,
supra note 2, at 71,91-93.
8. E.g., Christian Joerges & JiIngen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative
Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273, 285, 298-99 (1997);
Christian Joerges, "Good Governance" Through Comitology?, in EU COMMITTEES, supra note 2, at
311,312-13.
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dures depends on the "deliberative" nature of the process that is based on the
"national representation" in the comitology committee and the importance of
scientific argument rather than participatory involvement of interest groups or
stakeholders. According to Joerges:
[T]he correctness of risk decisions cannot be guaranteed by unme-
diated recourse to interests or their negotiation-or in legal terms,
by extending corresponding participation rights and veto positions
.... [B]y virtue of its feedback links to Member States [compare
with Member States representatives in comitology committee], co-
mitology can, in principle, take all social concerns and interests
into account while, at the same time, links with science (seen as a
social body) can be shaped so as to allow for the plurality of scien-
tific knowledge to be brought to bear. 9
The reliance on a different, indirect form of territorial representation
(national administrators in the comitology committee) and on scientific deliber-
ation as sources of legitimacy for delegated regulation, rather than the involve-
ment of civil society organizations, contrasts with the U.S. tradition of having
participatory procedures for stakeholders in such regulation. Some European
scholars did refer to the role stakeholders may play in delegated regulation," but
this has hardly ever been taken as a core issue of research. A remarkable excep-
tion comes from a U.S. scholar, Francesca Bignami, who has placed the issue of
participation in delegated regulation at the center stage of her research, and-
relying on the U.S. experience-has proposed the introduction of a notice and
comment procedure in EU delegated regulation."
The lack of attention paid to EU participatory procedures in delegated reg-
ulation is striking when one acknowledges that, since the end of the 1990s, Com-
munity institutions have developed a normative discourse on the importance of
civil society participation in European policymaking. In particular, the Euro-
9. Joerges, supra note 8, at 334.
10. Vos,supra note 7, at 210-11; Vos, supra note 2, at 31; Renaud Dehousse, Towards a Regulation
of Transitional Governance? Citizen's Rights and the Reform of Comitology Procedures, in EU COM-
MITTEES, supra note 2, at 109, 120-2 1.
11. See Francesca Bignami, The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution:
Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States, available at http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990501.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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pean Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the European Commission
(through its White Paper on European Governance) have stressed the added
value of civil society participation. 2 Yet the focus has been mainly on their in-
volvement in the drafting of new legislation, whereas little has been said about
functional participation in implementation.13 The Commission Communication
on "General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested
Parties by the Commission" (December 2002),4 which can be considered the
most important outcome of all this talk on civil society, is very illustrative of the
Commission's general attitude toward functional participation. The principles
are broadly defined as "participation, openness and accountability, effectiveness
and coherence," but the document is not legally binding and the Commission
stresses that "a situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could
be challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of the
interested parties."' 5 Moreover, the Communication explicitly excludes comitol-
ogy from its application, and thus seems mainly to aim simply at a broader use of
green papers and electronic consultations on new legislative initiatives.
Yet there would be good reasons to pay particular attention to the role of
functional participation in comitology procedures. First, it is precisely because of
the lack of, or limited, territorial representation in comitology, that it is worth
looking at functional participation as a complementary source of legitimacy.
Second, the experience of the United States with the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) shows that an institutional framework for functional participation,
in the broader context of due process and judicial review, can provide legitimacy
for delegated regulation. Third, as will be argued below, within the EU, judicial
review on "proceduralized" functional participation is more likely to develop
with regard to delegated regulation than with legislation, where functional par-
12. See Stijn Smismans, European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests, 9
EUR. L.J. 473, 482 (2003).
13. An exception is the normative discourse on the importance of "decentralized participation" in
the nonregulatory policy regime that is constituted by the open method of coordination. See Stijn
Smismans, EU Employment Policy: Decentralisation or Centralisation through the Open Method of Co-
ordination?, at 4-5, available at http://www.iue.it/PUBAaw04-I.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,2005).
14. See Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue: General Principles and Min-
imum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, COM(02)704 final.
15. Peter Bonnor, When EU Civil Society Complains-Civil Society Organisations and Ombuds-
manship at the European Level, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND LEGITIMATE EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE (Stijn
Smismans ed., forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the general principles and minimum standards
may, nevertheless, be used as soft law for review by the European Ombudsman).
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ticipation is ultimately always "covered" by the final word of the legislature-
the EP and the Council.
II. FUNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF
LEGITIMACY IN REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION
The fact that both EU legitimation discourses and the comitology literature
have paid limited attention to the participation of stakeholders or interest
groups in EU delegated regulation does not mean that such participation is non-
existent. To be sure, such participation is not as extensive and regulated as in the
United States. As far as functional participation of stakeholders does take place
in comitology, it is mainly informal, through direct lobbying of the Commission
or through contacts "back home" with the national representative in the comi-
tology committee (as deliberative supranationalism suggests). Yet, in some cases
such functional participation has also been institutionalized. This institutional-
ization differs strongly from the way functional participation is regulated in del-
egated regulation in the United States. Institutionalization also remains the
exception rather than the rule. Yet, institutionalized functional participation in
EU delegated regulation might function as a source of legitimacy. Moreover, as
will be argued below, if the Constitutional Treaty is implemented, the legitimacy
of delegated regulation may increasingly depend on the institutionalized func-
tional participation in it.
To provide a better insight into the reality of institutionalized functional
participation in delegated regulation in the EU, I will use the example of Com-
munity regulation in the field of occupational health and safety (OH&S). While
one should acknowledge that patterns of participation differ strongly according
to the policy sector, the field of OH&S provides an interesting case study. OH&S
has been the core field of European social regulation, including an important
amount of legislative Directives. Often these Directives have conferred regula-
tory implementation powers on the Commission, conditioned on a comitology
procedure. These procedures not only involve a "comitology committee," com-
posed of representatives from the national administrations, but they also ensure
forms of functional participation.
Two main procedures of "regulatory implementation" can be distinguished
in OH&S policy: the procedure for adaptation to technical change, and the pro-
cedure for setting occupational exposure limit values (which is actually a special
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type of the former procedure). 6 I will analyze how functional participation
might compensate for the lack of parliamentary representation in delegated reg-
ulation, or how it might counterbalance scientific expertise.
A. Functional Participation as Compensation for Lack of Parliamentary
Representation
1. The Procedure "Adaptation to Technical Change"
New machinery, new chemical and biological substances, and new production
processes create new types of occupational risks. Moreover, scientific development
leads to new insights into the dangerous nature of certain substances and produc-
tion processes and to new techniques for combating occupational risks (with lower
economic costs). For the legislature, it is difficult to keep up with all these develop-
ments. Continuously enacting new legislation, for instance at the EU level by leg-
islative directives (adopted by the Council and the EP), is a time-consuming
exercise. By the time a proposal has passed the complete legislative process, new
technical developments may already have seen the light of day. Moreover, territo-
rial representatives may be overburdened with very technical issues for which they
might lack the necessary expertise. A part of the OH&S regulatory process at the
European level has therefore been "delegated" to implementation measures. A
procedure of "adaptation to technical change" allows the Commission to enact Di-
rectives which "update" the technical aspects of existing legislation.
Nearly all legislative OH&S directives "delegate" implementation measures
via a procedure for adaptation to technical change. The two legislative OH&S
Framework Directives (of 1980 and 1989) describe this particular procedure, 17 to
16. Comparable procedures can be found in sectors such as environmental policy, food safety,
and product safety regulation. Detailed analyses of comitology in these sectors-although scarcely
paying attention to functional participation---can be found in several sources. See Christine Land-
fried, The European Regulation of Biotechnology by Polycratic Governance, in EU COMMITTEES,
supra note 2, at 173, 187-89; Thomas Gehring, Bargaining, Arguing and Functional Differentiation
of Decision -making: The Role of Committees in European Environmental Process Regulation, in EU
COMMITTEES, supra note 2, at 195, 199-201; Christoph Demmke, Comitology in the Environmental
Sector, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 2, at 279,
283-84; Sabine Schlacke, Centralization and Europeanization of Administrative Implementation:
Product Safety Legislation, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC,
supra note 2, at 303, 311.
17. Council Directive 80/1107, 1980 O.J. (L 327); Council Directive 89/391, art. 17, 1989 O.J. (L
275).
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which the individual legislative directives then refer. It involves a typical comi-
tology procedure: in order to adopt the implementation measures, the Commis-
sion has to consult a committee, which is chaired by a representative of the
Commission, composed of the representatives of the Member States. More pre-
cisely, the involvement of a regulatory committee is required, as described in the
Comitology Decision 87/373/EEC and revised by Decision 1999/468/EC. 5 If the
committee's opinion, expressed with qualified majority vote according to the
terms of Article 205 of the EC Treaty, is in accordance with the proposal of the
Commission, the latter shall adopt the measures. If the measures envisaged are
not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, or if no opinion is deliv-
ered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal re-
lating to the measures to be taken and inform the EP. The Council shall act by
qualified majority. If, on the expiration of three months from the date of the re-
ferral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the proposed measures shall be
adopted by the Commission.
The procedure for adaptation to technical change thus takes regulatory in-
tervention out of the hands of territorial representatives. Even though the posi-
tion of the EP in comitology has been improved by the 1999 decision, it remains
merely "informed." In theory, the Council may play a prominent role in comi-
tology, which would ensure the involvement of political territorial representa-
tives, but, in practice, comitology rarely leads to the involvement of the Council
because the deliberation between the Commission and national administrators
in comitology, for the most part, ends in agreement.
The procedure for adaptation to technical change applies, according to the
1989 Framework Directive, to take account of mainly two elements:
* technical progress, changes in international regulations or specifications,
and new findings, and
" the adoption of directives in the field of technical harmonization and stan-
dardization, such as product regulation concerned with OH&S.
Generally, individual legislative directives have an annex with technical speci-
fications, and it is those annexes that can be changed with the "adaptation to techni-
cal change" procedure. However, to avoid the Commission's bypassing the Council
18. Due to space limitations, I will not be able to elucidate the subtle differences between Coun-
cil Directive 87/373, 1987 O.J. (L 197), and the new Council Directive 99/468, 1999 O.J. (L 184). See
Lenaerts & Verhoeven, supra note 2, at 675-78.
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and the EP on issues that are not "strictly technical," the 1989 Framework Directive
states explicitly that other amendments to individual directives are only possible
through legislation. Some individual legislative directives specify even further that
legislative action is needed for certain specific amendments. 9 The aim is clearly to
ensure that only "purely technical adjustments" be left for implementation mea-
sures, leaving more "fundamental policy choices" to be made by legislation.
How does functional participation fit into this procedure? The treaty provi-
sions do not provide indications on functional participation in implementation
procedures. The conditions for the implementation processes are normally laid
out in the delegating legislative act: in this case, the legislative directive setting
up a procedure of adaptation to technical change. However, the OH&S legisla-
tive directives do not mention that any form of functional participation should
take place in the process of adaptation to technical change.2"
Despite this lack of provisions, one institutionalized form of functional partic-
ipation used in this implementation process is consultation of the tripartite Advi-
sory Committee on Safety and Health at Work. The Advisory Committee (AC) is
composed of three members for each Member State, with one representative of the
national administration, one representative of a trade union, and one representa-
tive of an employers' organization. The AC has, according to its statutes,21 the task
of assisting the Commission in the preparation and implementation of activities in
the fields of safety, hygiene, and health protection at work. Even if the Commission
is not obliged to consult the AC in such implementation, it has preferred to do so.
The normal procedure for adaptation to technical change is therefore as follows:
Commission initiative -- AC -- comitology committee - Com-
mission directive (or -- the Council)
2. Functional Participation as an Additional Source of Legitimacy
One can ask whether functional participation, for instance via a committee
like the AC, can be seen as an additional source of legitimacy in the implemen-
19. For example, the Work Equipment Directive 89/655, art. 9, 1989 O.J. (L 393) states that,
contrary to technical adaptations of the annexes, additions of supplementary minimum require-
ments to the annex can only be adopted by legislation.
20. For the exception of the particular procedure to set occupational exposure limits, see Coun-
cil Decision 2003 O.J. (C 218) 1.
21. Id.
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tation phase, especially to compensate for the lack of territorial representation.
The scholarly literature has generally proposed three ways to structure comitol-
ogy procedures to concerns of "good governance":22 (1) parliamentary control;
(2) scientific expertise; 23 and (3) proceduralization or institutionalization of in-
terest group participation.
24
The involvement of the AC in the adaptation of Directives to technical
change is a good example of the latter. The Commission drafts its "technical
change" amendments not only in collaboration with the comitology committee,
which represents the Member States, but also involves functional groups via the
AC. 25 A Commission directive is thus not a "pure technocratic construct of a
Commission bureaucracy" but builds on the deliberation of the comitology com-
mittee, which is supposed to draw back on national social concerns and inter-
ests, 26 and on the technical and interest-based deliberation of the AC.
The first option, to ensure extensive parliamentary control over comitology
procedures, has actually met with serious academic skepticism,27 because the EP
has neither the expertise nor the time to engage in daily control over the large
number of committees. However, resorting to functional participation as a way
to make the implementation procedure more legitimate does not exclude the
22. See Joerges,supra note 8; Dehousse,supra note 10, at 115.
23. See Joerges, supra note 8, at 332 (describing the role of political and legal science in the EU's
committees); Dehousse,supra note 10, at 115; Michelle Everson, The Constitutionalisation of Euro-
pean Administrative Law: Legal Oversight of a Stateless Internal Market, in EU COMMITTEES, supra
note 2, at 281 (analyzing legal oversight in European administrative law).
24. See generally Vos,supra note 7 (giving a general overview of EU committees and their recent
growth); Vos,supra note 2 (analyzing the role of EU committees in European product regulation);
Dehousse,supra note 10 (analyzing the legal status and legitimacy of comitology).
25. The normative proposals to organize interest group participation in comitology procedures
generally prefer a more "pluralist" model in which transparency, a sort of general "Administra-
tive Procedure Act" (APA), and judicial review of these procedures should guarantee equal access
for all concerned interests. See generally Jurgen Schwarze, Developing Principles of European Ad-
ministrative Law, PUB. L., Summer 1993, at 229 (giving an overview of modern European admin-
istrative law); Martin Shapiro, Codification of Administrative Law: The US and the Union, 2 EUR.
L.J. 26 (1996) (examining parallels between U.S. and European administrative law); Carol Har-
low, Codification of EC Administrative Procedures? Fitting the Foot to the Shoe or the Shoe to the Foot,
2 EUR. L.J. 3 (1996) (arguing that codification of EC procedures should reflect ECJ jurisprudence);
Dehousse, supra note 10; Vos, supra note 2.
26. See Joerges, supra note 8.
27. See The European Parliament and Comitology, supra note 7 (summarizing the interactions be-
tween the European Parliament and comitology committees); Dehousse, supra note 10; Joerges,
supra note 8.
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possibility that some (more modest) parliamentary control could be installed,
such as a right for Parliament to intervene when, in the implementation phase,
issues arise that members of the EP deem fundamental," or such as an ex post
monitoring on the correct procedural working of committees.
29
It is less clear whether additional legitimacy via functional participation of in-
terest groups could be combined with an ever increasing resort to deliberation
based on rational argument and scientific expertise. Some authors, such as Joerges
and Everson, point to the fact that, where the legitimacy of decisionmaking is
sought in the deliberative and science-based nature of the decisionmaking proce-
dure, there is less need for the inclusion of ever more "interests."
30
Yet the question is, to what extent do comitology committees have enough
"feedback links to Member States" to ensure that deliberation within these com-
mittees takes account of the social concerns that are inevitably linked to risk reg-
ulation. As made clear by the empirical part of the research of Joerges and
Neyer, the national representatives in comitology committees often do not have
enough time for domestic consultations with all interested parties.3
In more recent work, Joerges acknowledges the possibility of promoting the
articulation of interests at a European level via the procedure for including ex-
perts in the comitology committee.32 The alternative to such a method of repre-
senting interests via experts attached to the comitology committee, namely an
advisory committee composed of functional groups attached to the Commission,
is not mentioned by Joerges.33 Yet, my analysis of the AC shows that such an ad-
visory committee composed of interest groups may also contribute to scientific
and expert deliberation. The AC, in fact, not only provides a forum where inter-
est groups such as labor and management can express their view, but it also pro-
vides for deliberation, in which technical arguments are often predominant.
Whether one should prefer a comitology procedure with the comitology com-
mittee itself including experts (who may originate from functional groups) or a
28. See generally Dehousse, supra note 10.
29. See generally Joerges, supra note 8 (describing the role of political and legal science in the
EU's committees). See also Everson, supra note 23 (arguing that parliamentary committees should
trigger judicial review on the deliberative nature of committees).
30. See Joerges, supra note 8, at 334; Everson, supra note 23, at 307.
31. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 8, at 290.
32. Joerges, supra note 8, at 335.
33. The "bad experience" with an advisory committee in the foodstuff sector, upon which the
empirical research of Joerges and Neyer is based, might be the basis of discarding this option in
their normative proposal. See Joerges & Neyersupra note 8, at 279.
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procedure which combines a comitology committee with a separate advisory
committee would need to be tested by using both procedures in practice. On the
one hand, one can question, in the latter case, how the deliberation of the comi-
tology committee would relate to the deliberation of the advisory committee. On
the other hand, in the former case, the "experts" may intervene directly into the
deliberation of the comitology committee, but one can question whether the in-
clusion of "some" experts would be as representative as the "balanced" represen-
tation sought in the AC, involving one "expert" from each of the three groups
from each country.
B. Functional Participation to Counterbalance Scientific Expertise
1. The Procedure to Adopt Occupational Exposure Limits
Some OH&S legislative directives require a particular regulatory implemen-
tation procedure in order to adopt "occupational exposure limit values" (OELs),
which refer to the maximum amount of a certain agent a worker can be exposed
to. The definition of OELs requires particular scientific expertise, and should keep
pace with the ongoing discovery of new agents. The procedure to adopt OELs was
first introduced in 1988"4 to deal with exposure to chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal agents at work, but it is mainly used in the field of chemical agents, according
to the procedure set out in the 1998 Council Directive on chemical agents.
35
The Chemical Agents Directive distinguishes two types of OELs: binding
OELs and indicative OELs.3" Binding OELs have to be adopted via legislation.
37
34. Council Directive 88/642, 1988 O.J. (L 356) 74, is an amendment to Council Directive 80/
1107, 1980 O.J. (L 327).
35. See Council Directive 98/24, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 11 (discussing the protection of the health and
safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work). This Directive repeals the
1980 Council Directive, supra note 17, and its amendment by Directive 88/642, O.J. (L 356) 74,
supra note 34. Yet, the 1998 Directive only deals with chemical agents, whereas the other also dealt
with physical and biological agents. Subsequently, a separate Directive on biological agents has
been adopted, as have two on physical agents (one on vibration, another on noise), but without in-
troducing a procedure for the adoption of OELs.
36. In the case of indicative OELs the "Member States shall establish a national occupational ex-
posure limit value, taking into account the Community limit value, determining its nature in ac-
cordance with national legislation and practice." Id. art. 3(3). However, in the case of binding
GELs the "Member States shall establish a corresponding national binding occupational exposure
limit value based on, but not exceeding, the Community limit value." Id. art. 3(5).
37. Id. art. 3(4).
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Indicative OELs can be adopted by Commission Directive via a procedure com-
parable to the "adaptation to technical change" procedure.
Both in the case of binding OELs (legislation) and indicative OELs (adapta-
tion to technical change), the first stage of the procedure is identical and can be
described as follows:
Commission initiative (scientific dossier) -> Scientific Committee
for Occupational Exposure Limits (SCOEL) -> notice and com-
ment procedure -> SCOEL
This first step of the procedure has not been exhaustively described in the
Chemical Agents Directive, which is limited: "[T]he Commission shall evaluate
the relationship between the health effects of hazardous chemical agents and the
level of occupational exposure by means of an independent scientific assessment
of the latest available scientific data."38 However, as early as 1993, the Commis-
sion had already adopted a guidance note39 on the procedure for setting OELs
within the context of the (now repealed) 1988 directive.
The procedure begins with the preparation of a "scientific dossier" by the
European Commission, who will subcontract to private organizations or ex-
perts, or will rely on the expertise of national expert bodies or international or-
ganizations. Subsequently, the Commission will send the scientific dossier to the
SCOEL." The SCOEL is composed of scientific experts that represent the range
of specialist expertise in chemistry, toxicology, epidemiology, occupational med-
icine, and hygiene. The SCOEL evaluates data from different sources (and thus
not only the scientific dossier). Moreover, an announcement is made in the Offi-
cial Journal to request further data.4 On the basis of the scientific dossier and the
supplementary data, the SCOEL formulates a short document which describes
the recommended OELs. The Commission reveals the recommended OELs to
38. Id. art. 3(1).
39. Health and Safety Commission, Establishment of Occupational Exposure Levels in the Eu-
ropean Community, Guidance Note on the Procedure for Scientific Review and Evaluations, and
Arrangements for Consultation, Doc. 803-2/93 (Nov. 11, 1993).
40. The SCOEL has been formally constituted by a Commission Decision of July 12, 1995.
Commission Decision 95/320, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 188) 14-15. However, it actually replaces an
older informal "Scientific Expert Group," which was established to prepare the first Commission
Directive setting OELs. Commission Directive 91/322, 1991 O.J. (L 177) 22-24.
41. E.g., 1994 O.J. (C 094) 3-4.
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the interested parties along with a request for health-based scientific comments,
and eventually, further data. After a comments period of about six months, the
SCOEL reviews the document again in light of the comments received, and
adopts the final version.
The procedure differs according to whether it has to be a binding OEL or
an indicative OEL. In the case of a binding OEL, the procedure would be the
following:
Recommended OEL by SCOEL -- (AC ->) formal Commission
proposal -- EESC -- EP -- Council (directive).
The consultation of the EESC and the joint decision of the EP and the
Council result from the legislative basis of Article 137 of the EC Treaty. There is
no explicit requirement to consult the AC, but the 1993 Guidance Note promises
its consultation. Moreover, nonconsultation would be a strong deviation from
the established practice to consult the AC on all legislative proposals in the
OH&S field.
In the case of an indicative OEL, the procedure would be the following:
Recommended OEL by SCOEL -> AC -- comitology -- Com-
mission directive (or -> Council directive)
Contrary to the procedure for binding OELs (via legislation), the 1998
Chemical Agents Directive explicitly requires the consultation of the AC for the
setting of indicative OELs. After consultation of the AC, the Commission
adopts its formal proposal for indicative OELs, which has to pass the comitology
procedure for "adaptation to technical change."
To date, no binding OELs have been adopted, either under the (now re-
pealed) 1988 Directive, or under the 1998 Chemical Agents Directive. All OELs
have been adopted by Commission Directives setting indicative OELs.42
The Commission seems to prefer the procedure for indicative OELs rather
than going the long way, through legislation, to obtain binding OELs. Actually, in
42. Two Commission Directives have adopted OELs in the context of the now repealed 1988
Directive. See Commission Directive 91/322,supra note 40; Commission Directive 98/24, 1998 O.J.
(L 131) 11-23. One Commission Directive is in the context of the Chemical Agents Directive.
Commission Directive 2000/39, 2000 O.J. (L 142) 47-50.
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its initial proposal for the Chemical Agents Directive, the Commission tried to re-
tain only one procedure (leading to Commission Directives)43 while the EP44 (and
the EESC)45 stressed that binding OELs should pass through legislation. The final
Chemical Agents Directive does provide a double procedure, but as long as the
Commission weighs the advantage of the "adaptation to technical change proce-
dure" more heavily than the disadvantage of having "merely" indicative OELs,
the procedure to adopt binding OELs via legislation may remain unused.
2. Functional Participation as Additional Source of Legitimacy
On the one hand, the setting of OELs is a very technical issue that requires
the involvement of those familiar with chemistry, toxicology, epidemiology, oc-
cupational medicine, and hygiene. The SCOEL and the procedure established
in the Guidance Note of 1993 should remedy this need. On the other hand, the
protection of workers' health and safety often stands or falls with the allowed
level of exposure to certain agents.46 Because OELs often determine the core of
OH&S protection, these decisions cannot entirely be left over to technical ex-
perts. Technical experts can define how dangerous agents are and express their
opinion on the necessity and feasibility of avoiding certain levels of exposure, but
the social acceptance of certain risks should be expressed by a democratic pro-
cess. Moreover, scientists are not "untouchable" and they have to work under
conditions of scientific uncertainty. 47 A certain level of democratic control and a
43. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of the Health and Safety of Workers
from the Risks Related to Chemical Agents at Work, 1993 O.J. (C 165) 4.
44. Legislative Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the European Parliament on the Pro-
posal for a Council Directive on the Protection of the Health and Safety of Workers from Risks
Related to Chemical Agents at Work, EUR. PARL. Doc. (AP-0185), 1994 O.J. (C 128) 167 [herein-
after Legislative Resolution Embodying the Opinion].
45. Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of the Health and Safety
of Workers From the Risks Related to Chemical Agents at Work, EESC Opinion, 1994 O.J. (C
034) 42, § 3.12.1.
46. The same, for instance, applies in the case of environmental law, where the core of the mat-
ter centers around the limit values. Schaefer argues that, in this context, the comitology commit-
tees dealing with the definition of such limit values are "in some respects ... the most far-reaching
legislative type of committee." Guenther F Schaefer, Committees in the EC Policy Process: A First
Step Towards Developing a Conceptual Framework, in SHAPING EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 7, at 18.
47. "Uncertainty is rarely due to a simple need to do more research. Rather the phrase is short-
hand for a whole series of methodological, epistemological, and even ontological problems inher-
ent in determining the level of danger." Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting
in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Administration, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
109, 115 (2000).
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balance between different discourses beyond the scientific are desirable. There-
fore, the first list of binding OELs was adopted through legislation in the 1998
Council Directive on Chemical Agents; the directive requires that future bind-
ing OELs will also have to travel the same legislative road. Consequently, terri-
torial representatives in the EP and the Council, and functional groups in the
EESC and in the AC can have their say on the definition of binding OELs.
However, bearing in mind that there are more than 100,000 existing chem-
ical substances, 48 as well as many complex mixtures arising from work processes,
it is evident that the Community cannot adopt GELs for all of them, especially
not through the slow legislative process. The possibility of adopting indicative
GELs via a Commission directive may slightly facilitate the impressive (but by
definition eternally incomplete) task.
The procedure aims at a balanced deliberation, first of a scientific nature
within the context of the SCOEL; second via the technical and interest-based
deliberation of the AC; and third in the context of the comitology committee
representing national interests. The entire process is guided by the Commission
representing the general interest of the Community.49
Two particular remarks regarding functional participation should be made.
First, the initial stage of the procedure focuses on scientific deliberation and the
notice and comment procedure introduced by the 1993 Guidance Note does not
have the same function as notice and comment under the APA in the United
States. Unlike notice and comment under the APA-where it is a general prin-
ciple for delegated legislation-the notice and comment procedure analyzed
here is established ad hoc, for this particular directive. Moreover, it aims at gath-
ering "purely" scientific data, in contrast to the plurality of voices and interests
permitted in the notice and comment procedure under the APA.
Second, according to the Guidance Note, it is only at the level of the AC that
it is necessary to take account of both technical and socioeconomic and interest-
based information. As in the case of the procedure of adaptation to technical
change described above, it can be argued that the AC has a particular role as an
48. This is identified in the European inventory of existing commercial chemical substances,
quoted by the 1993 Commission's Guidance Note on the procedure for scientific review and eval-
uations, and arrangements for consultation. Health and Safety Commission, supra note 39.
49. For a comparable "balance among committees," see Andreas Bicker et al., Social Regulation
through European Committees: An Interdisciplinary Agenda and Two Fields of Research, in SHAPING
EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 7, at 50.
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additional source of legitimacy to compensate for the lack of territorial represen-
tation via the EP (and the Council).
In the case of the 1998 Chemical Agents Directive, this is exemplified by the
fact that the consultation of the AC is required explicitly in the procedure for the
adoption of indicative OELs through Commission directives, whereas there is no
such explicit requirement for the adoption of binding OELs through legislation.
5 0
It is also worth remembering that, in general, legislative directives provid-
ing implementation procedures do not require the consultation of the AC (al-
though in practice the AC is nearly always consulted). That the Chemical
Agents Directive does explicitly require consultation of the AC may be linked to
the "quasi-legislative nature" of the process of defining the acceptable levels of
exposure, 5' even if "merely" indicative. Moreover, it may also be seen as a partic-
ular recognition of the AC as the best forum to counterbalance and control the
"purely scientific deliberation" of the SCOEL.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
As analyzed in the preceding section, institutionalized functional participa-
tion could be a source of legitimacy in EU delegated regulation, compensating,
to a certain extent, for weak territorial representation and to counterbalance sci-
entific expertise. If this is the case, one can ask whether judicial review can play
a role in ensuring such functional participation, for instance, by requiring the
consultation of committees such as the tripartite Advisory Committee on Safety
and Health at Work, or by requiring that such committees should be "represen-
tative" of the interests in that sector. Yet, whereas judicial review on functional
participation in delegated regulation is well developed in the United States,
there are strong limits on such review in the EU. This can be illustrated again
with the case of OH&S delegated regulation.
50. In the original Commission proposal for the Chemical Agents Directive, there was no ex-
plicit requirement to consult the AC. It was under the pressure of those institutions that are
excluded from the procedure for setting indicative OELs, namely the EP and the EESC, that the
requirement to consult the AC was finally included. See Council Directive 98124,supra note 35, at
4; Legislative Resolution Embodying the Opinion, supra note 44, at 167; Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Protection of the Health and Safety of Workers from the Risks Related to Chem-
ical Agents at Work,supra note 43.
51. Thus the debate in the AC on setting of OELs appears more politically sensitive than most
issues of adaptation to technical change. Personal interviews with AC members.
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A. Ensuring Consultation
If the tripartite advisory committee is supposed to be a source of legitimacy
in the implementation phase, which can compensate for the lack of involvement
of parliamentary representation, can judicial review then ensure such "legiti-
mating input"?
The statutes of the AC define the task of that committee, but do not impose
an obligation on the Commission to consult it. The EC Treaty does not mention
the AC at all, and most delegating OH&S Directives do not require the consul-
tation of the AC either. As a consequence, although in practice consultation of
the AC is the general rule, the Commission has on some rare occasions presented
its formal proposal, or made its decision, without having heard the opinion of
the AC.
In the case of the 1993 Working Time Directive, on which the AC had not
been consulted, the Court of Justice has confirmed the absence of a requirement
to consult the tripartite committee. 2 The United Kingdom contested the legal
basis of the Working Time Directive, arguing that the issue of working time
should not be considered as an occupational health and safety issue. To obtain
the annulment of the Working Time Directive before the Court, the United
Kingdom argued that, unlike the tradition of elaborating Council Directives
based on Article 118a of the treaty, this time the AC had not been consulted.
This cast doubt on the link between the directive and the health and safety of
workers and constituted a procedural defect sufficiently serious to render the di-
rective invalid.13 The Court, however, replied that under Article 2(1) of the AC
Statutes "such consultation is intended only '[to assist] the Commission in the
preparation and implementation of activities in the fields of safety, hygiene and
health protection at work,' and does not therefore constitute a condition prece-
dent for action by the Council."54 It follows that a Council directive cannot be
annulled for lack of consultation with the AC." This judgment is in line with
52. Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. E.U. Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755.
53. Id. para. 34, at 152.
54. Id. para. 41, at 684.
55. The Court did not state this explicitly, probably because (contrary to the Advocate General)
it treated the United Kingdom's argument on the AC as only one factor in proving the non OH&S
character of the Working Time Directive and not as a plea on infringement of procedural re-
quirements. The Court therefore limits its observation to saying that "the failure to consult that
committee cannot be relied on to cast doubt on the link between measures laid down by the direc-
tive and the protection of the health and safety of workers." Id. para. 41, at 715.
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the Court's general reluctance to review legislation. The Court leaves broad dis-
cretion to the Council, and will not annul its legislative acts if there is no strict
legal requirement for consultation.
56
However, the Court is more open to judicial review in implementation pro-
cedures, and has begun to develop a jurisprudence enforcing strictly the proce-
dural rules governing the functioning of committees in the implementation
phase.57 In the Angelopharm case,58 for instance, the Court decided an amendment
to the Cosmetics Directive59 was invalid because the Scientific Committee for Cos-
metology had not been consulted. The Cosmetics Directive provided that adapta-
tions to technical progress could be realized via a comitology procedure. The
procedure not only involved a comitology committee, composed of Member State
representatives, but also provided that the amendments necessary for adapting to
technical progress be adopted "after consultation of the Scientific Committee for
Cosmetology at the initiative of the Commission or of a Member State" (Art. 8(2)
Cosmetics Directive). According to the Commission and the intervening govern-
ments, this stipulation leaves it to the discretion of the Commission and the Mem-
ber States to decide whether they want to consult the Scientific Committee. The
Court, however, noted that "the article can also be interpreted as meaning that it
is for the Commission or the Member States to take the initiative to convene the
Scientific Committee, which must be consulted in all cases."6 Given the ambigu-
ity of the wording, the Court argued that, to determine whether the consultation
of the Scientific Committee is mandatory, it is necessary to refer to the Commit-
tee's role in the procedure for adaptation to technical change.
6
1
The Court then referred to the preamble of the Cosmetics Directive, which
states that cosmetics product regulation should be founded on scientific and
technical assessments. Because neither the Commission nor the Comitology
56. See Joined Cases 281,283,284,285, & 287/85, Germany v. Comm'n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203 (giving
a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty provision requiring consultation of the Economic and So-
cial Committee).
57. Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt Minchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitit Miinchen, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5469; Case C-244/95, Moskof v. Ethnikos Organismos Kapnou 1997 E.C.R. 1-644 1; Case
C-263/95, Germany v. Comm'n 1998 E.C.R. 1-441.
58. Case C-212/91, Angelopharm GmbH v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1994 E.C.R. 1-171.
59. Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Cos-
metic Products, 76/768/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 169, amended by Council Directive 82/368/EEC
1982, O.J. (L 167) 1.
60. Angelopharm GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-179.
61. Id. at 1-180.
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Committee is in a position to carry out such assessments, the Scientific Commit-
tee has been set up to ensure this function. Therefore, its consultation must be
mandatory in all cases, and nonconsultation leads to the invalidity of the adapta-
tion directive.
The Angelopharm case might be an inspiration for the few OH&S imple-
mentation procedures in which the consultation of the AC is explicitly required.
However, while the Court might strictly enforce procedural rules with regard to
scientific committees because it believes that the scientific quality of arguments
might compensate for the lack of political debate on risk regulation, it is not
clear that the Court is likely to develop a comparable argument for functional
participation. Strict screening of consultation requirements for scientific com-
mittees might just be part of a broader tendency toward the development of a
general principle of requiring that risk regulation be based on a certain level of
scientific assessment.
62
There is, to date, no sign in the case law that the Court attributes an equal
importance to functional participation or balanced interest group participation
in risk regulation. 63 Cases such as Angelopharm and Technische Universitat
Mfinchen6 deal with scientific committees, whereas most other cases strictly en-
forcing procedural rules governing the functioning of committees deal with co-
mitology committees composed of Member States representatives. 65 While it
seems to be recognized that national representation via comitology committees,
and scientific argument via scientific committees can compensate for the lack of
62. On the relevant case law and the debate on how far the ECJ is likely to develop the criterion
of scientific expertise as a "meta-positive principle" in risk regulation, see generally INTEGRATING
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE INTO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING, supra note 6; Joerges & Neyer, supra
note 8; Institutional Aspects ofComitology, supra note 7. See also Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health
v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3305; Case LT-70/99 Alpharma v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3495.
63. See L6ic Azoulay, The Court of Justice and the Administrative Governance, 7 EUR. L.J. 425-41
(2001). Azoulay sees in the UEAPME case the potential for a more general procedural require-
ment calling for the creation of "consultative forums" or "contradictory and representative proce-
dures" (other than procedural requirements for "adversarial expertise" on the basis of scientific
knowledge). In my view this would require a very strongsaut qualitatif given that the UEAPME
case conceived of the importance of functional participation only in a well-established (pseudo-)
legislative procedure where social partners are said (still, according to the Court) to replace the
democratic representation of the European Parliament. See Case T-135/96, Union Europdenne de
l'Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (UEAPME) v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2338.
For a detailed analysis, see SMISMANS, supra note 3, at 339-55.
64. Technische Universit~it Minchen, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5502.
65. See, e.g., Moskof, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6493; Germany, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-478.
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involvement of the EP and Council in implementation measures, the role that
functional participation can play in that sense is less apparent.
There are three ways to require consultation of advisory committees such as
the AC on the basis of the established case law such as Angelopharm and Tech-
nische Universitdt Miinchen. First, the Court can simply stress the importance of
respecting procedural requirements. Yet such judicial review can only take place
when there is a clear obligation to consult such an advisory committee. Euro-
pean delegating legislation should, therefore, take more care in setting out the
procedural requirements for functional participation in implementation. Sec-
ond, the Court could recognize the contribution of the AC in providing scien-
tific expertise, which could require the AC's consultation on the basis of
Angelopharm and Technische Universitdt Miinchen, even if the legal obligation for
consultation is not so explicitly established. Yet it remains to be seen whether ad-
visory committees composed of functional groups would be recognized as part
of the requirements to ensure the correct "scientific assessment" of implementa-
tion measures. In Technische Universitdt Minchen, the Court acknowledged that
technical expertise is not only a qualification of "scientific experts" but that the
concerned party "is best aware of the technical characteristics" and should there-
fore be heard. Obviously, there is still a gap between recognizing that the con-
cerned party (addressed by an individual decision) is a bearer of technical
expertise and recognizing that a functional group (which may be representative
of a concerned party) has such a qualification.
Third, the Court could explicitly recognize the importance of functional
participation in its own right, implying a strict enforcement of procedural rules
governing the consultation of advisory committees composed of concerned
parties, in the same way as it has recognized the importance of national repre-
sentation via comitology committees and scientific argument via scientific com-
mittees in implementation procedures.
B. Ensuring a Representative Nature
In addition to ensuring that consultative procedures are respected, can judi-
cial review play a role in ensuring the representative nature of such procedures?
In the United States, the representative nature of participatory procedures in
delegated regulation is assumed by the fact that everybody has the same right of
access. In the EU, on the other hand, functional participation is structured more
by political or administrative intervention, that is, who can participate depends
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on the decision of the Commission or Council. Can the Court intervene in this
process?
In Hauptzollamt Miinchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitat Miinchen, the Court
of Justice ruled invalid an implementing Commission decision (among others) be-
cause the scientific committee consulted by the Commission to make that decision
was not considered "representative," that is, the members of that committee did
not possess the technical knowledge they could be expected to have to adequately
perform their technical task. In order to obtain duty-free importation of a scien-
tific instrument, Regulation No. 2784/79 requires the Commission to set up a
group of experts composed of representatives of all the Member States to examine
whether the instrument fulfills the conditions. Although the regulation did not
specify the qualifications of the members of such a scientific committee, the Court
stated that "the group of experts cannot properly carry out its task unless it is com-
posed of persons possessing the necessary technical knowledge in the various
fields in which the scientific instruments concerned are used or the members of
that group are advised by experts having that knowledge."6 Because these condi-
tions were not met in the case at hand, the Court ruled that the Commission deci-
sion was invalid. Under certain conditions, the Court is thus in favor of judicial
review of committee procedures in the implementation phase for what could be
called reasons of "representativity." However, it does not follow that the same rea-
soning could be applied to ensure the representativity of functional participation,
that is, of civil society organizations, in delegated regulation.
First, as argued above, the Technische Universita't Munchen case can be placed
into an emerging category of ECJ case law that values scientific expertise as a
procedural requirement for legitimate risk regulation." The representativity of
a scientific committee consists in its members' having the necessary technical ex-
pertise enabling an "objective" technical decision. The representativity of the
AC, on the other hand, consists of an equal representativity of the concerned
functional groups (management and labor) and national interests. The Court's
willingness to develop review of implementation measures to ensure the scien-
tific value of risk regulation does not imply that the Court would be equally will-
ing to develop such review of the "representativity" of functional participation
in such risk regulation.
66. Technische Universitit Miinchen, 1991 E.C.R. para. 22.
67. See id.
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Second, the Technische Universitat Minchen case deals with an individual
implementation decision addressed to a private party. The Court stresses that, in
such cases, the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administra-
tive procedures should be respected, such as the "duty of the competent institu-
tion to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the
individual case and the right of the person concerned to make his views known
and to have an adequately reasoned decision."6 However, it is confirmed case
law of the Court to apply less procedural rigor with respect to regulatory imple-
mentation than to administration directly addressed to individuals, or, in the
words of the Court, judicial review must be less the more "the act concerned is
of general scope."'69 Put differently, judicial review on delegated regulation will
be less rigorous than on individual decisions but is likely to be more rigorous
than on legislation.
Third, although there may be more space for judicial review on the represen-
tation of an advisory committee that is to be consulted in the drafting process of a
Commission directive through comitology than on such consultation in a legisla-
tive process, there remains a risk of conflict between the judgment by the court
and that by political representatives. Namely, the composition of an advisory com-
mittee may have been decided by Council decision, as is, for instance, the case with
the tripartite Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work. So even in a
case where the representation of the committee would be contested in the context
of a regulatory implementation procedure, intervention by the Court would mean
replacing the political judgment on representation given by political representa-
tives in the Council with the judgment by unelected judges. The ECJ is reluctant
to interfere in this way, and judicial review on representation, if developing at all,
will most likely be limited to committees set up by the Commission.
C. General Limits ofJudicial Review on Functional Participation
As shown in my example in the field of OH&S, judicial review on functional
participation in EU governance appears fairly limited. The reluctance to use judi-
68. Id. para. 14.
69. See Case C-150/94, United Kingdom v. Council [111 E.C.R. 1-7235 (1998); Case T-521/93,
Atlanta v. Comm'n [10/11/12] E.C.R. 11-1707 (1996); Case T-122/96, Federolio v. Comm'n [9/10]
E.C.R. 11-1559 (1997); Case T-199/96, Bergadem v. Comm'n [7/8] ECR 11-2805 (1998);seealso L6ic
Azoulay, The Judge and The Community's Administrative Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN
EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 118 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002).
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cial review as a way to ensure functional participation in legislative procedures, or
in relation to committees set up by Council decision can easily be understood by
the fear of replacing the judgment of political representatives with the decision of
judges. However, in relation to regulatory implementation and participatory
structures set up by administrative decision, judicial review on functional partici-
pation is desirable. Two general characteristics of the EU institutional setting-
that contrast with the United States-make it difficult for such review to develop
today. First of all, there is a lack of strong institutionalization of, and procedural
requirements for, functional participation. Second, there are strong limits on locus
standi for interest groups before the ECJ. 71 If functional participation is taken se-
riously as a source of legitimacy in regulatory implementation and administra-
tion, the requirements for such participation should be institutionalized and the
position of interest groups before the Court should be strengthened.
IV. DELEGATED REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY
On October 29, 2004 the Heads of State of the newly enlarged European
Union signed the EU's Constitutional Treaty, 7' the outcome of a deliberative and
negotiative process that took place first in the European Convention and subse-
quently in the Intergovernmental Conference. If the Constitutional Treaty is
ratified, it will replace the current Treaty establishing the EC and the Treaty on
the European Union. The enlargement of the EU made such a constitutional re-
vision necessary, but other objectives inspired this reform, such as the idea that a
simplification of the EU's instruments and procedures would make the EU
more comprehensible to its citizens and thus increase its legitimacy. One of the
central ideas was to provide the EU with a clear hierarchy of norms and a clearer
delineation between the legislative and executive braches of government. We
cannot provide here a detailed assessment as to what extent these objectives have
been reached.72 Yet, when looking at regulatory implementation, one should
conclude that the Constitutional Treaty is not free of ambiguity.
70. For a recent analysis, see Olivier De Schutter, Group Litigation Before the European Court of
Justice, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND LEGITIMATE EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE, sUpra note 15.
71. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, Dec. 16, 2004, O.1. (C 310) 47 (2004),
available at http//europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/JOHtml.do? uri =OJ:C:2004:3 10:SOM:EN:HTML (last
visited Feb. 11, 2005).
72. See Paul Craig, The Constitutional Treaty: Legislative and Executive Power in the Emerging
Constitutional Order (European University Institute 2004), available at http://ideas.respec.org/p/
erp/euilaw/p0007.html (last visited Feb. 11,2005).
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The Constitutional Treaty contributes to simplification and transparency as
far as legislation is concerned. European legislation is now clearly defined with
the terms "European laws," which are of general application, binding in their
entirety, and directly applicable in all Member States, corresponding to current
regulations, and "European framework laws" that are binding on the Member
States as to the result to be achieved, but leaving them the choice of means of
achieving the result, corresponding to current directives, 73 characterized by the
ordinary legislative procedure (with some exceptions) that is based on co-
decision and qualified majority vote and places the Council and the European
Parliament on an equal footing.74
Article 1-37 confirms that the implementation of such European legislation
is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. Yet, "where uniform condi-
tions for implementing binding Union acts are needed, those acts may confer
implementing powers on the Commission, or, in specific cases ... on the Coun-
cil of Ministers." Union implementing acts shall take the form of European im-
plementing regulations 75 or European implementing decisions. 76 Article 1-37
also states that "European laws shall lay down in advance the rules and general
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Com-
mission's exercise of implementing powers." This phrasing clearly recalls the
current basis for comitology provided in Article 202 of the EC Treaty. One
would therefore expect that European regulatory implementation may take the
same form as is currently the case, mainly through delegation to the Commis-
sion, controlled by comitology procedures.
However, the nature of comitology is likely to be revised. Article 1-37 of the
Constitutional Treaty requires that the mechanisms for control by Member
States of the Commission implementing acts (comitology) must be laid down in
73. See TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 71, art. 1-33.
74. Id. art. III-396.
75. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe states:
A European regulation shall be a non-lcgislative act of general application for the
implementation of legislative acts and of certain provisions of the Constitution. It
may either be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, or
be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
Id. art. 1-33.
76. "A European decision shall be a non-legislative act, binding in its entirety. A decision which
specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them." Id. art. 1-33.
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European laws, adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure, and no longer by
the Council of Ministers alone, acting unanimously, as has been the case for the
current Comitology Decision. Since the EP will thus have a co-decision role in
defining the comitology procedures in a new European law, it is likely that the
position of the Parliament in these procedures will be strengthened.77
Moreover, the picture becomes more complicated because the Constitu-
tional Treaty provides a new category of norms, defined as "delegated European
regulations" (Article 1-36). European laws and framework laws may delegate to
the Commission the power to adopt delegated European regulations to supple-
ment or amend certain nonessential elements of the law or framework law. The
Constitutional Treaty requires that "the objectives, content, scope and duration
of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the European laws and
framework laws." It also stresses that "the essential elements of an area shall be
reserved for the European law or framework law and accordingly shall not be
the subject of a delegation of power."
According to Article 1-36, such
European laws and framework laws shall explicitly lay down the
conditions to which the delegation is subject; these conditions may
be as follows: (a) the European Parliament or the Council may de-
cide to revoke the delegation; (b) the delegated European regula-
tion may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed
by the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by
the European law or framework law.
The introduction of the category of "delegated European regulations" is a
reply to the critique that European legislation is too detailed. As things stand,
the legislator has no satisfactory mechanism to delegate the technical aspects or
details of legislation while still retaining control over such delegation. He is
obliged either to go into minute detail in the provisions he adopts, or to entrust
to the Commission the more technical or detailed aspects of the legislation as if
they were implementing measures, in which case, control is entrusted to the
Member States via comitology, but not satisfactorily to the European legislator.
77. Herwig C.H. Hofmann, A Critical Analysis of The New Typology of Acts in The Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 7 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 8 (2003), available
at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-009a.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
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The introduction of such a category of delegated regulations has been
strongly supported by the European Commission, premised on the hope that it
would lead to a dismantling or weakening of comitology. In that case, regulatory
implementation by the Commission would not be conditioned by the control of
the Member States through comitology committees.
The introduction of "delegated European regulations" may thus imply a
shift in conceiving the legitimacy of regulatory implementation. The legitimacy
of comitology procedures resides in the ex ante input through deliberation by
Member State representatives in the comitology committees. In contrast, the le-
gitimacy of delegated European regulations would reside in the ex ante defini-
tion in the law, by the Council and the EP, of the conditions for delegation,
combined with some control expost if the measure should not be to the liking of
the Council or the EP.
78
Conceiving the legitimacy of European regulatory implementation in this
way would bring us closer to the U.S. system of delegated regulation. 79 How-
ever, one should acknowledge all elements of the U.S. system of delegated regu-
lation. As discussed above, it is not only a question of having a more clearly
defined legislative mandate. The legitimacy of the system also depends on the
judicial review of such delegation and on a regulated system of participatory
procedures for stakeholders, again with judicial review.
If the EU were to do away with comitology, it may not be enough to ensure
legitimacy of regulatory implementation by simply improving how the condi-
tions of delegation in the law are set out. Judicial review of such delegation is de-
sirable. Moreover, if the input ex ante of Member State representatives were
lacking, it would be desirable to strengthen and regulate the input ex ante by
stakeholders.
As analyzed in this paper, the participation of stakeholders in European reg-
ulatory implementation is partially institutionalized, and to a certain extent, the
78. See Craig, supra note 72, at 32.
79. The system would remain in any case considerably different because delegation is conceived
of only in favor of the European Commission. European laws and European framework laws
cannot delegate the power to enact delegated European regulations to other agencies and bodies.
The Constitutional Treaty in fact "constitutionalises a strict understanding of limitations to dele-
gation under what is known as the 'Meroni-doctrine."' Hofmann, supra note 77, at 6. While this
constitutional phrasing may be in tension with some tendencies in EU governance, it clearly con-
firms a limit on the establishing of multiple agencies which would have considerable decision-
making power. See TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra note 71, art. 1-36.
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ECJ could build on current case law to strengthen judicial review of such partic-
ipation. If comitology were to lose importance as a control mechanism on dele-
gated regulation, the ECJ may be ready to strengthen judicial review of the
participation of stakeholders. Yet, as seen in our analysis above, stronger judicial
review can only go hand in hand with a stronger institutionalization of partici-
patory rights. Whether such institutionalization should take the form of a more
pluralist system of interest intermediation like in the United States, or could
build on a corporatist pattern more common within Europe, remains undis-
cussed. Space precludes such a debate here, but some food for thought can be
found elsewhere.
80
In any case, whether the U.S. experience with functional participation in
delegated regulation may be an inspiration for the EU will depend on whether
the introduction of the category of delegated European regulations in the Con-
stitutional Treaty implies a real step back from comitology. The Constitutional
Treaty is ambiguous on this point.
Two factors play an important role here. First, Article 1-36 gives two ex-
amples of conditions to which delegation is subject. Yet this list is not exhaustive.8'
One could imagine that also for delegated European regulations under Article I-
36, the European law or framework law would require the respect of a comitology
procedure, with or without a callback option by the EP or the Council.
However, during the discussion preparing the Constitutional Treaty, it ap-
peared that at least the European Commission considers the use of a regulatory
or management committee of comitology in contradiction with the nature of a
delegated European regulation. 2 A callback procedure (i.e., either the power of
the legislator to withdraw the delegation of competence conferred to the Com-
mission or the veto by the legislator against the adoption by the Commission of
a concrete measure on that basis) would not be compatible with maintaining a
comitology committee procedure that allows only the Council to quash the
Commission's measure following a negative opinion issued by the committee of
Member State representatives. According to the Commission, this would be
contrary to its aim to place both legislative branches on an equal footing with re-
80. See SMISMANS, supra note 3, at 447-56.
81. In an earlier draft of the article discussed in the Convention, the list of options was longer
but exhaustive. See Hofmann, supra note 77, at 12.
82. See European Commission, Working Group IX on Simplification, The European Conven-
tion, Working Document, at 27 (PP/mm-D (2002) 700167), Nov. 18, 2002, available at http.//
european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd9/54 19.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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gard to the Commission's executive activity (at least as far as acts adopted by co-
decision are concerned). Consequently, a callback procedure could only function
with purely consultative committees that would supply the Commission with
expertise and opinions concerning the concrete application of executive mea-
sures at the national level.
Second, the relation between delegated European regulations and Euro-
pean implementing regulations is ambiguous. Delegated European regulations
are based by definition on a European law or a European framework law. A Eu-
ropean implementing act (which can be a regulation or a decision) implements a
binding Union act, which can be the Treaty itself, a legislative act (law or frame-
work law), or a delegated European regulation. s3 A European implementing
regulation can thus be used to implement a law or framework law, or to imple-
ment a delegated European regulation.84 In the first case, it will be up to the leg-
islator to decide whether he prefers to leave detailed regulation to a delegated
European regulation or to a European implementing regulation.
Put differently, it is entirely up to the European law or European framework
law to define the conditions for regulatory implementation, whether by relying
more on the legitimacy of the EP and the Council in defining delegation and pro-
viding a callback option, or by simply referring to a comitology procedure, or by
a combination of these. While the "maximum control option," combining, for in-
stance, a callback option with a regulatory comitology committee seems exagger-
ated, one should also be aware that doing entirely away with comitology and
relying on the control mechanisms mentioned in Article 1-36 may be too minimal.
As Craig argues, it may often be difficult for the Council and the EP to specify
with any exactitude the criteria that should guide the exercise of power by the
Commission. Moreover, if comitology is dismantled, then it may not be easy for
the Council or the EP to decide whether to exercise their powers relating to revo-
cation of the delegation, and/or entry into force, because they might not have the
requisite information with which to make this decision. 5 Therefore, the more one
83. See Chairman of the Working Group IX on Simplification, Final Report of Working Group
IX on Simplification, at 9 (CONV 424/02), Nov. 29, 2002, available at http://register.
consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvOO/00424en2.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
84. The reading of the Constitutional Treaty theoretically allows for a law delegating to a dele-
gated European regulation which subsequently leaves regulatory measures to European imple-
menting regulations. This further complicates the possible combinations of control mechanisms
on regulatory implementation.
85. See Craig, supra note 72, at 33.
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dismantles comitology, the more it is desirable to provide participatory procedures
for stakeholders and ensure judicial review of such procedures.
The debate on the Constitutional Treaty has left these questions unresolved.
Yet they have very important consequences on the democratic nature of European
policymaking as they draw the line between legislation and administrative regu-
lation, and conceive participation in, and democratic control over, regulation.
CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of delegated regulation is conceived of quite differently in
the EU and in the United States. In the United States, such legitimacy resides in
the combination of a clear legislative mandate, participatory procedures, and ju-
dicial review. In contrast, the legitimacy of European regulatory implementa-
tion is largely ensured by the "control ex ante" by Member State representatives
in comitology committees. Yet comitology procedures have been criticized for
their lack of transparency and lack of parliamentary involvement.
Strangely enough, the role of stakeholder participation in European regula-
tory implementation has never been a hot topic in European political and aca-
demic debate. While the issue of civil society participation has pervaded EU
institutional discourses over the last years, this has surprisingly not been the case
regarding a stage of policymaking where such participation may prove to be
particularly important in terms of legitimacy and democratic control, namely
regulatory implementation. Moreover, in reality, functional participation does,
to a certain extent, take place in European regulatory implementation. As the
example of occupational health and safety regulation shows, such participation
can be a source of legitimacy in regulatory procedures where parliamentary par-
ticipation is weak or as a way to counterbalance scientific expertise. Yet to date,
functional participation is weakly institutionalized and the possibilities for judi-
cial review are limited.
The new Constitutional Treaty may give rise to a reconceptualization of the
legitimacy of European regulatory implementation and strengthen the impor-
tance of functional participation therein. The category of European delegated
regulation seems to take a step back from control by Member States through co-
mitology committees and to go into the direction of the U.S. style of delegated
legislation which combines legislative mandate with participatory procedures
and judicial review. However, whereas the constitutional text is ambiguous on
whether there is some real intention to withdraw (partially) from comitology,
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the consequences for the importance of participatory procedures and judicial re-
view in regulatory implementation did not even enter the constitutional debate.
Put differently, the EU's "constitutional moment" that took form around the
European Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the
Constitutional Treaty has lost an important occasion to discuss an important
question each modern democracy must deal with: how to organize administra-
tive regulation in a democratic way.
